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Abstract-This paper considers a Stackelberg type location game over the unit square [0, l] x [0, 11. 
There are two chain stores, Players I and II, which sell the same kind of articles. Each store is 
planning to open a branch in region [0, 11. The purpose of each store is to decide the location to open 
its branch. In such a situation, the demand points, i.e., the customers, distribute continuously over 
[0, l] in accordance with cdf G(.). E ac h customer wants to buy at a closer store between them, but 
never moves more than a distance e. We also assume that Player I is forced to behave as the leader 
of this game, and the opponent (Player II) is to be the follower. It is shown that there are various 
types of Stackelberg equilibriums according to the conditions of G(.) and e. @ 2003 Elsevier Ltd. 
All rights reserved. 
Ke~ords-Nonzero sum game, Location, Infinite game, Stackelberg equilibrium. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers a Stackelberg type location game over unit square [0, I] x [0, 11. The model 
is described as follows. 
There are two chain stores which deal in the same kind of articles. Each of the two stores is 
planning to open a branch at some region where there are no such stores now. The region takes 
the shape of a line segment, so that we represent it as the unit, interval [0, 11. The purpose of 
each store is to decide the location to open its branch in [0, 11. Though both stores duopolize this 
new market over [0, 11, it is natural to assume the possibility to open at the same time by both 
stores is negligible. Thus, one of the two stores is forced to behave as the leader of this game, 
while on the other hand the opponent is to be the follower. we have to consider a Stackelberg 
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type location game. We call the leader Player I and the follower Player II, respectively. Under 
the above situations, the demand points, that is customers, distribute continuously over [0, l] 
in accordance with cdf G(.). Each of the customers wants to buy at the closer store between 
them, but never moves more than a certain distance L (0 < e < 1). Each player has to decide the 
optimal location from the viewpoint of Stackelberg equilibrium. 
Here, we summarize the assumptions and notations to show our model explicitly as follows. 
(i) The customers (demand points) distribute continuously over the line segment [0, l] in 
accordance with cdf G(.) which has its pdf g(.). 
(ii) When a store locates at point z E [0, 11, a customer who lives at point t E [0, l] goes to 
buy at this store with probability u(t 1 z). 
(iii) Each customer usually wants to buy at the closest store in [0, I]. 
Under the assumptions mentioned above, Player I locates first his branch at point 5 E [0, 11. 
Then Player II decides the location y E [0, I] of his branch after observing the location z of his 
opponent. That is, Player I is the leader and Player II is the follower in this game. Each player 
has to decide the location of his branch which maximizes to obtain the number of customers 
in the interval [0, I] on the steady state from the viewpoint of Stackelberg equilibrium, at their 
planning stage. When both players locate their branches at the same position in [0, l], Players I 
and II share the market between them with even ratio. 
Belated to this game, Hotelling first pointed out and considered the location problem from 
the viewpoint of stability in competition between two players in 1929 [I]. After that, much re- 
search extended his work from a game theoretical viewpoint (for example, [2-71). Gabszewicz and 
Thisse [8] summarized an excellent survey in Handbook of Game Theory. But, they analyzed and 
considered Nash equilibrium for the location game but not Stackelberg type. Osumi et al. pro- 
posed and analyzed competitive facility location models but not exactly game theoretical [9,10]. 
2. GENERAL FORMULATION 
Let Mi(z, y) be the expected payoff to Player i (i = 1,2) when Players I and II locate their 
branches at points z and y in [0, 11, respectively. We have 
is 
;z+Y)‘2 u(t I x) g(t) dt, x < Y, 
Ml(X,Y) = f J; u(t I x) g(t) dt> x = Y, 
J&+y),2 4t I xl g(t) d4 x > Y7 
is 
(z+y)‘2u(t 1 y)g(t) dt, 0 y < x, 
M2hY) = 
( 
; s: u(t I Y) g(t) & Y = x, 
Is ;z+yj,24t I Y)dt)dt, Y > 5. 
(1) 
Here, we establish the pure strategy for each player. Since this game is a nonzero sum infinite 
game between the leader (Player I) and the follower (Player II), it is natural to define x E [0, l] as 
the pure strategy for Player I and y(x) E [0, l] as th e p ure strategy for Player II. And the purposes 
of two players have to decide y*(x) and x* which satisfy the following two stage maximization 
process. 
Since Player II is the follower of this game, he can maximize his playoff Mz’(x, y(x)) by selecting 
strategy y(x) after observing x of Player I. On the other hand, Player I is the leader and knows 
the payoff functions of both players Mr(x, y), Mz(x, y), and hence, he learns Player II’s set of best 
responses {Y*(X) I M~(Y*(x)) = SUP,MZ(S,Y)) t o any strategy x of Player I. Having this infor- 
mation he then maximizes his payoff by choosing Z* from condition Mr (z*) = supZ Mr(x, y*(x)). 
Thus, the situation (x*, y* (x*)) is an equilibrium point which gives the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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Before discussing our main problem, we examine the case where the customers do not select a 
store depending on its position, that is, 
u(t I 2) = u(t), for all z E [0, 11. 
Then this game is a constant-sum game because of (1) and (2). Putting V = Jtu(t)g(t)dt, 
K(z) = J: u(t)g(t) dt, we obtain 
(3) 
(4 
Let to be the unique root of equation K(t) = (l/2) V in [0, 11. Then we obtain three hinds of 
payoff to Player II according to x of Player I as follows: 
[K(T) < K(x) < f V, y<x<to, 
442(&Y I x < to) = 
/ 
;JC Y = x7 
1 v-K(F) <V-K(~), x<min(y,te), 
y<x=to, 
y = x = to, 
y > x = to, 
and 
M2(X,Y 1 x > to) = Y = x7 
y>z. 
Hence, Player II should choose strategy y*(x) such that for sufficiently small E > 0 
for 2 < to, 
for x = to, 
for x > to. 
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K (x + a> < ; v, x < to, 
Ml (x, Y*(x)) = fV> x =to, 
K (z - f) <fK x>to, 
he selects x* = tc as the leader’s optimal strategy. As a result Player II is forced to locate at 
y* (CC*) = to as his optimal strategy. By the way, (to, to) is the saddle point of kfi (2, y) given 
by (3) and Mz(lc, y) given by (4). Thus, we have Proposition 1. 
PROPOSITION 1. Let to be the unique root of equation K(t) = (l/2) V in the interval [0, 11. Then 
(to, to) is a pair of optimal strategies for constant-sum game (3) and (4), that is, Nash equilibrium 
point. Furthermore, (to, to) also gives Stackelberg equilibrium as a result for the leader-follower 
game on (3) and (4). The equilibrium values are given by 
Ml@O, to) = Mz(to, to) = ; v 
3. MAIN PROBLEM 
We consider our main problem in this section. Here, we assume that each customer goes to a 
store within distance e, but never moves more than distance e, that is, 
u(t 1 z) = 
I, +estsz+e, ZE[OJ], 
0, otherwise. 
Then we get 
G(min(y,x+Y)) -G(max(O,x-e)), X<Y, 
W(x, Y) = i (G(min(1, x + e)) - G(max(0, x - e))}, x = Y, (5) 
G(min(1, x + e)) - G (m-(F,x-e)), X>Y, 
I 
G (min (F,y +e)) - Gb44 Y - 0, Y < X, 
~2hY) = f {G(min(l, y + e)) - G(m=(O, y - e))}, Y = x, (6) 
G(min(1, y + e)) - G (max(F,y-t)), Y>X. 
Let to be the unique root of equation G(t) = l/2 in the interval [0, l] and assume that 
e<min(to,l--to)<:, 
for the sake of argument. If not, our main problem is not different from one in the latter half of 
Section 2, essentially. 
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Now, we show the expected payoffs to Player II Ms(y(~) ] z), given that he has learned 5 of 
Player I, according to the case where 0 5 z _< e, e < z < 1 - e, and 1 - & 5 z 5 1 as follows: 
( G(x+Q, y<x-2&<x<& 
I ; G(x + Q o<y=xcle, 
x<Y5e, 
(7) 
I G(Y + e) - G(y - e), 
I l- iG(x+e), 
I l-WY+& 
( G(x+4, 
I G(Y + 4 - G(Y - 9, 
G 
xse<yg-e, y>x+2e, 
xse<i-e<y, ysx+2e, 
xse<i-e<y, y>x+2e, 
y<y<e<xd-e, y<x-2e, 
y<e<xd-e, y>x-2e, 
e5y<x<l-e, y<x-2e, 
esy<x<l-e, ykx-2e, 
M2(Y(X) 1 e < X < 1 -e) = ( + {G(x i- e) + G(x -e)}, e 5 y = X -C 1 -e, 
(8) 
I WY + 4 - G(Y - 4, e<x<y<i-e, ya62e, 
1 l-G(F), 
I 1 - G(Y -q, 
and M2(y(x) ] 1 - P 2 x 5 1) has a symmetrically similar form with M,(y(x) ] 0 < x 5 1). 
We shall derive the optimal strategy y*(x) which maximizes Mz(y(x) ] 0 < x 5 e) and 
M2(y(x) ) e < x < 1 -C) given by (7) and (8), respectively. 
3.1. Case Where g(z) Decreases with .z 
We examine the case where g(z) is a decreasing function with respect to z here. G(z + e) - 
G(z - e) has its maximum G(2e) t a z = e. When Player I selects 2 in’ [0, !], Player II should 
choose y(x) = X--E which gives him G(x-E), or y(x) which maximizes G(y+e)-G((x-+y)/2) for 
y E (x, 2e], where E is a sufficiently small positive number. For x E (e, 2e], Player II should select 
y(x) = L’ which gives the maximum value G((x + Q/2) for y E (0,x), or y(x) which maximizes 
G(Y+e)-G((x+y)/2)foryE( x, min(1, x + 2e)]. If x > 2e, we get y(x) = e immediately. 
On the other hand, Player I knows Player II’s consideration. Hence, he should select x = e, or 
x which maximizes G(x + e) - G((x + e)/2) f or x E (a, 1). These considerations lead us to the 
following procedure. 
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PROPOSITION 2. We can lead an optimal Stackelberg strategy of the follower (Player 11) for 
nonzero sum game (7) and (8) in case that g(z) is a decreasing function with respect to z, 
according to the following procedure. 
(1) Let y1 be the value y E [0,x] that maximizes G(min(((a: + y)/2), 2-!)), and Jet VF be the 
maximum. 
(2) Let yz be the value y E [x,min(l,z + 2e)] that maximizes G(z + e) - G((a: + y)/2), and 
Jet Vf be the maximum. 
(3) An optimal strategy y*(r) of Player II given z is obtained from 
Y*(x) = 
1 
a, forVln> b’, 
y2, for Vf < V$. 
THEOREM 1. Let t* be the unique root of equation G((t + @/2) = (l/2) G(2Q in the interval 
[0, e]. Then an optimal Stackelberg strategy x* of Player I is given by x* = t*. Thus, the 
resulting optimal Stackelberg strategy y* (t’) of Player II is the value y E (t*, 1) which maximizes 
G(y + e) - G( (y + t*)/2). And the Stackelberg equilibrium values VT for I and ua for II are given 
u; = f G(2C); . 
3.2. Cases Where -g(z) is Unimodal 
We also consider the case where -g(z) is a unimodal function with respect to z, that is, there 
exists t, E (0,l) such that 
‘(‘) 1 
decreases for z 5 t,, 
increases for .z > t m. 
For the sake of an interesting argument, we also suppose that 
e < i min(t,, 1 - tm) 
is this case. 
A similar argument as in Section 3.1 holds on interval [0, tm], and the symmetrical argument 
holds on interval [I&, l] because of our assumptions mentioned above. Thus, we have a procedure 
described in Propositions 3 and 4. 
PROPOSITION 3. We can get an optimal Stackelberg strategy of the follower (Player II) for 
games (7) and (8) under the above assumptions, according to the following procedure. 
In Case 1, Player I seJects his location x in [0, tm]. 
(1) Let y1 be the value y E [0, a] w IC maximizes G(min((z + y)/2,2!)), and Jet VF be the h’ h 
maximum. 
(2) Let y2 be the value y E [x, min(1, x + 2!)] which maximizes G(y + e) - G((x + y)/2), and 
Jet Vf be the maximum. 
(3) Let y3 be the value y E [max(l - e, x), l] which maximizes 1 - G(max(1 - 2L, (x + y)/2)), 
and Jet V3” be the maximum. 
(4) Let j* be the number j which gives max(Vp, Vf, V,“). 
Then, y*(x) = yj* is a candidate of optimal Stackelberg strategy for Player IIgiven that 0 5 x 5 t,. 
Jn Case 2, Player I selects his location x in [tm, 11. 
(1) Let y; be the value y E [0, min(e, x)] which maximizes G(min(2& (x + y)/2)), and Jet Vf 
be the maximum. 
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(2) Let yi be the value y E [max(O, 2 - 2!), CC] which maximizes G((z + y)/2) - G(y -e), and 
let Vf’ be the maximum. 
(3) Let yi be the value y E [l - e, l] which maximizes 1 - G(max(1 - 2& (z-+ y)/2)), and 
let Vt’ be the maximum. 
(4) Let j* be the number which gives max(V,n’, VP, V,“‘). 
Then, y*(x) = yj* is a candidate of optimal Stackelberg strategy for Player II given that t, < 
x 5 1. 
The proposition leads us to Theorem 2, easily. 
THEOREM 2. Let ti and t; be the unique root of equations G((t + l)/2) = (l/2) G(2l) in [O,!] 
and 1 - G(l - 2Q = (l/2) G(l - (t + 1 - e)/2) in [l - -& 11, respectively. Let y:, y.$, yz, and y$ 
be defined as follows: 
yT = arg max 
YWJ) 
, 
y2* = arg yG~~~t:,{+~) --6(1-~-O}, 
Y; =e, 
and 
And define v(yj*), j = 1,2,3,4, as follows: 
- G (1 - y; - e) ) 
w (y;) = G (2~;) - G(0) = G(2C), 
and 
w (y;) = G(1) - G (y; - e) = 1 - G(l - 2e). 
F’inally, we denote y* as the maximizer for {~(y,‘) ] j = 1,2,3,4}. 
Then a pair of strategies (x*, y*(x*)) gives Stackelberg equilibrium as a result for the leader- 
follower game on (5) and (6), w h ere x* of Player I and y* (x*) of Player II are given as follows: 
x* = ( lfe] and y*(x*)={ lye], jfy*={ i]* 
4. SIMPLE EXAMPLES 
Here, we show simple examples on our main results given in the previous section. 
First, we examine the case where g(z) = 2(1- Z) and e < l/2. Since G(z) = 22 - z2, we easily 
find 
t*=2-e-2Jm 
and y* = e is the value y E (t*, 1) which maximizes G(y + e) - G((x + t*)/2), and we obtain a 
pair of optimal Stackelberg strategies (x*, y*(x*)) given by 
(x*,y* (x*)) = (t*,e) . 
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The equilibrium values V; for I and V; for II are 
Note: when C = 0.25, we get t* M 0.17. 
Next, we also examine the case where 
s(z) = 4 
{ 
l-z, fort& 
1 
z, for z > - 2’ 
and 
We easily have that both of the pairs (!, 1 - I!) and (1 - l, e) are Stackelberg equilibrium points. 
The equilibrium values are 
v; = v; = G(24. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this report, we formulated our problem under general forms of cdf G(z) and selecting 
probability u(t 1 z), h owever, analyzed only on two kinds of special types. As we observed in 
Sections 3 and 5, Stackelberg equilibrium points take on various kinds of aspects according to 
the types of G(z) and ~(t 1 z). Th ere remain a lot of problems to solve. 
Finally, we remark that considering Stackelberg equilibrium is more realistic compared to the 
Nash equilibrium in such a location game. 
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